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Hearing All American Voices: Interpreting the Little Bighorn 
Mark Schock 
The true nature of the events of June 25, 1876, continues to elude us. To this day 
Custer buffs, Native Americans, and professional historians alike debate what actually transpired 
beside a certain Montana river which wirnessed so much bloodshed and so little clariry. Was it a 
horrible massacre, or a great victory? As a multi-racial and multi-ethnic nation, we have failed to 
reach any consensus. We cannot even agree if that meandering river should be catled the Greasy 
Grass or the little Bighorn. 
How then do historians search for the particulars of the events that unfolded there? 
What tools and sources should be employed? Historians are especially fond of primary sources. In 
any military encounter there are at least two sides and usually at least two versions of the events. 
In this case one side, the white American, has left behind many written documents detailing a 
number of different versions of what transpired. There are official reports, personal 
correspondences, inquiry proceedings, and newspaper accounts. It is these sources which have 
been the backbone of most of the histories written. There are also oral accounts left by the 
Arikara and Crow scouts who participated in the battle on the side of the whites. These accounts 
have unfortunately, until recently, been largely dismissed or ignored. 
The Lakota and Cheyenne accounts have also, until recently, been dismissed and 
ignored with rare exceptions to certain details. These accounts, being oral in nature and the 
product of a different cultural perspective from that of the American mainstream have been 
viewed with suspicion and increduliry. Are not these primary sources also worthy of the 
historian's attention? The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that these accounts, once 
correctly interpreted, are indeed potentiatly as valid as the usual primary sources employed by the 
historian and that along with those usual sources are essential to any comprehensive examination 
of Custer's last battle. 
The practice of military historiography is fraught with peril. The stakes are high. 
National honor and prestige are involved, as well as the legacy and reputation of the individual 
military personnel involved, especially commanding officers. Reports and statistics compiled 
from military sources should be viewed with caution. 
Less than two weeks before Custer's defeat on the Little Bighorn another famous 
Indian fighter, General George Crook, clashed with the Lakota and Cheyenne on Rosebud Creek. 
Crook officially reported his casualties as ten killed and twenry-one wounded. Though the true 
numbers are in dispute, it is generally believed that Chief Scout Frank Grouard's figures of 
twenry-eight killed and fifry-six wounded are more reliable. Crook claimed that his retention of 
the field of battle constituted victory, but the truth is that he subsequently retreated to his supply 
base and refused to advance again until reinforced, effectively removing his column from the rest 
of the campaign. Eminent Western historian, Robert Utley, offered this opinion of Crook at the 
Rosebud. "In truth, he had been badly worsted."24 
Just as a nation's military personnel are expected to uphold the finest traditions of 
their service, the historian writing military history is also expected to protect the reputations and 
honor of those who serve. The recent controversy over the death of pro- football player turned 
Army Ranger Pat Tillman in Afghanistan is a fitting example of how protective the military can 
be of its own reputation and to what lengths it will go to protect that reputation and the 
reputations and careers of its people. 
24 Robert Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Anny and the Indian, 1866-1891, The 
Wars of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Bloomington, IN: Indiana Universiry 
Press, 1977), 256. 
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Politics and politicians are prime players. Clausewitz's dictum that "war is not merely 
an act of policy but a true political instrument,"25 certainly held true for early accounts of Custer's 
defeat. Republican President Ulysses S. Grant was running for reelection and "the Custer tragedy 
dropped as from heaven into the arms of Democrats struggling against Republican campaign 
orators seeking to clothe them in the bloody shirt of treason and disunion. The Little Bighorn 
disaster, laid on a backdrop of corruption in high places and scandalous frontier fraud, instantly 
became a pawn on the political chessboard."26 
Newspapers, a favorite primary source for historians, were unabashedly politically 
partisan in the nineteenth century. Newspaper accounts of Bighorn were hampered by the fact 
that only one reporter, Mark Kellogg, had accompanied Custer's command on the expedition. 
Kellogg, an assistant of Bismarck Tribune editor Clement A. Lounsberry, sent reports back to the 
Tribune to also be forwarded to the New York Herald. Kellogg perished alongside the soldiers he 
was coveringP Kellogg's last dispatch before the expedition set out proved prophetic, though 
probably not as he intended. "I go v..>ith Custer and will be at the death."28 
As news of the Seventh Cavalry's defeat spread to the East, Democratic newspaper 
editors launched vitriolic assaults on the Grant administration. On July 16 the New York Herald 
posited the question, "Who Slew Custer?" The Herald was ready with the answer. "The celebrated 
peace policy of General Grant, which feeds, clothes and takes care of their noncombatant force 
while the men are killing our troops-that is what killed Custer."29 
Southern newspapers joined their colleagues from the North in denouncing Grant. The 
Ga/t;eston Daily Ne1n declared, "The deplorable truth is that President Grant is chiefly responsible 
for the appalling miscarriages which have attended this disastrous campaign against the Sioux."30 
The Raleigh News laid "the blood of Custer, of Canby, and hundreds of United States soldiers" on 
the hands of the Grant administtation.31 
Western newspapers slammed Grant's Indian policy. The Yankton Dakotaian headline 
of July 7 screamed CUSTER AND HIS ENTIRE COMMAND SWEPT OUT OF 
EXISTENCE BY THE WARDS OF THE NATION AND SPECIAL PETS OF EASTERN 
ORATORS.32 Some in the East agreed. In Connecticut, the Hartford Daily Courant crowed, "But 
when will the government deal with these ferocious Indian tribes as they deserve? When v..>ill a 
policy be adopted that shall prevent such murders as those of Canby and Custer, and give peace 
to our frontier settlers?"33 
Controversy and the need to find an explanation that would not offend public 
sensibilities raged within Army circles also. George Armstrong Custer and his President and 
Commander in Chief Ulysses Grant were not mutual admirers. Custer had written articles for the 
periodical Ga/a:g critical of Grant's Indian policy. He had testified before the Clymer committee 
25Carl von Oausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 87; quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: 
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002; Anchor Books, 2003), 7. 
26 Robert M. Utley, Custer and the Great ContrrJt'ersy: Origjn and Development of a Legend 
(Pasadena, CA: Westernlore Press, 1962), 39. 
27 Ibid., 30-31. 
28 Louise Barnett, Touched by rlre: The Lift, Death, and Mythic Afterlift ofGeoTJ,e Armstrong 
Custer (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996; Owl Books, 1997), 335. 
29 Utley, Custer, 39. 
30 Galveston Daily News, 16 July 1876, http:/ /www.newspaperarchive.com, accessed 
February 24, 2009. 
31 Utley, Custer, 39. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hartford Dai!J Courant, 6 July 1876, 
http:/ /www.Infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy.wichita.edu/, accessed February 22,2009. 
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investigating Secretary of War William W. Belknap in the spring of 1876 and had linked Grant's 
brother, Orvil, with corruption in the War Department in that testimony)4 
At the conclusion of his testimony, Custer attempted on several occasions to meet with 
Grant and was repeatedly rebuffed. Grant did, however, order Custer to remain in Washington. 
Custer was originally designated to command the Dakota column of the planned three-pronged 
1876 expedition against the Lakota and Cheyenne, and ignoring Grant's order to remain in 
Washington boarded a train to the West. When the train stopped in Chicago a member of 
General Phllip Sheridan's staff arrested Custer on the order of the President. Furthermore, Grant 
had ordered that Custer be barred from participating in the Sioux expedition. 35 
General Alfred Terry was given overall command of the Sioux expedition by Grant. 
Custer, considered being still technically under arrest, continued by train to St. Paul, Minnesota, to 
meet with Terry. Generals Sheridan and William T. Sherman, each being politically astute, 
refused to intercede for Custer with Grant. Custer turned to Terry and literally took to his knees 
to ask Terry to intercede with Grant. Grant, under attack from the Democratic for ordering 
Custer's arrest, eventually relented, and Custer was allowed to accompany expedition as 
commander of the Seventh Cavalry, not the Dakota column commander.36 
Still, Custer was extremely popular with the American people. Rumor and innuendo 
persist to this day that Custer's close friend James Gordon Bennett, the powerful Democratic 
editor of the NerP York Herald, was secretly encouraging Custer to seek the presidency himself on 
the Democrat ticket, evidencing his popular supportY Any effort to focus blame on him for the 
disaster could incite a public firestorm. himself now under attack from the press and 
Custer's adherents inside the Army, wrote two reports of the disaster. first "official" 
report of Custer's defeat, written at the battle site on June 27, only recounted Custer's movements 
leading to the battle. But on July 2, at the mouth of the Bighorn, Terry penned a confidential 
report to Sherman and Sheridan. In this report, Terry explained his plan to trap the hostiles 
between Custer's column and another under Colonel John Gibbon. He summed up this report by 
stating, "I feel that our plan must have been successful had it been carried out [by Custer]."38 
Terry had briefed Gibbon and Custer on his plan aboard the steamer Far West on June 21.39 
Sherman had received this confidential report prior to the official one because of the 
routes the two reports had traveled to reach him. Sherman then handed the confidential report to 
a man who claimed to be a messenger to be forwarded to the Secretary of War. The "messenger" 
was in fact a reporter for the Philadelphia Enq11irer, and this report splashed across newspapers on 
July 7, two days before the "official" Terry report was printed in newspapers. Thus, while 
attempting to avoid a public firestorm, Terry was now in the center of a huge one. Democratic 
newspaper editors now focused their wrath on the hapless Terry.40 
Grant and a number of high level officers rushed to defense. Grant told the 
New York Herald that, "I regard Custer's Massacre as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer 
himself, that was wholly unnecessary--wholly unnecessary."41 General Samuel D. Sturgis, the 
actual commander of the Seventh Cavalry, was absent from the expedition on a long tour of 
detached service and had lost his son in the battle. Sturgis commented that Custer "was a brave 
man, but also a very selfish man. He was insanely ambitious of glory ... tyrannical and had no 
regard for the soldiers under him."42 
34 Stephen E. Ambrose, CraiY Horse and C11ster: The Parallel Lives ofTwo Amencan Warriors 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975; Meridian, 1986), 397-403. 
35 Ibid., 403. 
36 Ibid., 404-405. 
37 Ibid., 399-400. 
38 Utley, C11ster, 42. 
39 Utley, Frontier Reg11lars, 25 7. 
40 Utley, C11ster; 43. 
41 Ibid., 44. 
42 Ibid., 45. 
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As the controversy continued to play out in the press, newspapers even sought the 
opinions of former Confederate officers. Ex-Confederate John McCausland, interviewed by 
Bennett's New York Herald stated that, "The only way to fight with cavalry is with a dash--to 
charge." Confederate General Thomas L. Rosser had opposed Custer in the Shenandoah 
campaign. Responding to charges of reckJessness on Custer's part in the Philadelphia Enquirer, 
Rosser placed the blame on Major Marcus A. Reno. "I fail to see anything very rash in the 
planning of it, or reckJessness in its attempted execution. On the contrary, I feel that Custer 
would have succeeded had Reno with all the reserve of seven companies passed through and 
joined Custer after the first "43 
The search for a scapegoat would eventually focus on Reno. In an effort to clear his 
name and resurrect his floundering military career, Reno requested and was granted an official 
court of inquiry. The court convened in Chicago on January 13, 1879.44 
Custer had divided his command before attacking the village at the little Bighorn. 
Captain Frederick Benteen with three companies was to sweep south of the village to prevent any 
Indians from escaping in that direction. Major Reno was to take three companies and attack the 
village from the south. Custer, with five companies was to paral1el Reno's advance behind a ridge 
to the east and arrack the village at the far end.45 
Reno attacked across the little Bighorn into the village, but was repelled and his 
command retreated back across the river in disorder, eventua11y to a position now known as Reno 
Hill. There appears to be no doubt that Reno lost his nerve after being splashed vilith blood and 
brain matter when the Arikara scout Bloody Knife was killed at his side during the retreat.46 But 
that was not what made Reno a prime scapegoat in the Custer debacle. 
Benteen's contingent joined Reno's at Reno Hill late in the afternoon. Benteen showed 
Reno a note from Custer ordering Benteen to come join him and bring ammunition. Reno 
outranked Benteen, but he did not have the authority to overrule Custer's order.47 Despite 
Custer's note, Reno and Benteen stayed on Reno Hill until relieved by Terry and Gibbon's 
column on June 27.48 The fact that they made no attempt to reach Custer is what made Reno 
scapegoat fodder. \Vhether such an attempt would have been successful or would have only 
served to compound the disaster is still being debated today. 
The Reno Court of Inquiry of 1879 was summed up by Rutgers University professor 
Louise Barnett this way in her biography of Custer, Touched by Fire: 
It has commonly been held that after the Battle of the little Bighorn the army closed 
ranks at the court proceedings to preclude criticism damaging to itself: Further scrutiny 
of the campaign-which had been a waste of time, money, and men- could only 
reinforce the public's antimilitary sentiments. In interviews with Walter Camp, the 
interpreter Frederic F. Gerard said that "the general understanding among all whom he 
talked with confidentially was that any officer who made himself obnoxious to the 
defense would incur the wrath of certain officers in pretty high authority."49 
43 Philadelphia Enquirer, 11 July 1876, http:/ /infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy.wichita.edu/, 
accessed February 22, 2009. 
44 Barnett, 310. 
45 James Welch \Nith Paul StekJer, /(j//ing Custer: The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Fate 
of the Plains Indians (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1994; New York: Norton, 2007), 
149. 
46 Ibid., 158. 
47 JohnS. Gray, Custer's List Campaign: Mitch Bl!)ler and the Little Bighorn Recon.rtructed, with 
a foreword by Robert M. Utley (IJncoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991; Bison Books, 
1993), 308. 
4R Utley, Custer, 27. 
49 Barnett, 311. Gerard quote from, Walter Camp, Custer in '76: Walter Camp's Notes on 
the Custer Fight, ed. Kenneth Hammer (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1976), 238. 
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Reno was officially cleared of any dereliction of duty by the inquiry. so Though the Army cleared 
him, Reno remains a favorite target of many in the popular mind as well as among scholars. 
The nature of any nation's collective military memory demands some degree of 
protection for the reputation of that nation's military heroes. George Armstrong Custer was 
certainly no exception. As a man who fostered and won wide public acclaim, especially in the 
print press, he was also assured that the defense of his fame and reputation would be quick, if not 
sure. Quick, in that it would begin immediately upon his demise. Not sure, though, in that much 
of that defense would be based in myth and rumor, and also that his polarizing nature would leave 
room for many detractors. 
So much myth, rumor, and renunciation would follow in the wake of that June day's 
events that preeminent historian of the American West Robert M. Utley would write a book 
dedicated not to the event or the man, but instead to the controversy surrounding both. In that 
work Utley wrote, "Before the professional historian even entered the picture, most of the 
common fallacies of the Little Bighorn had been introduced and had won widespread 
acceptance."Sl Utley would single out the press for special mention. "To the press must be 
assigned a large share of the responsibility for spreading the errors, myths, and legends that clutter 
the history of the Little Bighorn."52 
The press was far from alone in distorting the historical record of the man and the 
event. Nineteenth century partisan politics, especially virulent in an election year, influenced the 
debate. In addition, the "official" Army record of correspondence and proceedings was 
significantly colored by attempts to deflect blame and responsibility, seemingly motivated by the 
desire to protect individual and institutional reputations. 
The above cacophony of voices provided the majority of source material for most, if 
not all, histories of Custer's last battle for the first century after the event. Glaring in its absence is 
the voice of the Indian participants in those events. That voice is finally being heard, long after 
the actual participants themselves have died. Their memories were indeed recorded in the years 
following the battle. "Their statements were obtained by Army personnel, newspaper 
correspondents, anthropolo~o,>-ists, historians, and others who were genuinely interested in our 
ftontier."53 Yet, their accounts were certainly under utilized, if not flatly ignored by white 
historians for most of a century. \X'hy? 
Utley, who made extensive use of Indian memories in his 1993 biography of Sitting 
Bull, The Lance and tbe Sbield, provided us with a general overview of the difficulties white 
historians and readers have with Indian accounts. 
Indian testimony is difficult to use. It is personal, episodic, and maddeningly 
detached from time and space, or sequence and topography. It also suffers from a 
lanbruage barrier often aggravated by incompetent interpreters, from the cultural gulf 
between questioner and respondent, and from assumptions of the interviewer not 
always in accord with reality. 54 
As Utley points out, Indian accounts, especially of battle, are often individual in nature. 
Plains Indian warriors fought as individuals, not as members of companies, regiments, or 
columns. The Cheyenne historian, John Stands in Timber, explained the individual nature of 
so Ibid., 312. 
s l Custer, 29. 
s2 Ibid., 47. 
Richard G. Hardorff, ed., Indian Views of tbe Custer Figbt: A Source Book (Spokane, WA: 
Arthur H. Clark Company, 2004; Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 12. 
54 Robert M. Utley, foreword to JohnS. Gray, Custer's Last Campaign: A1itcb Boyer and the 
Little Bighorn Reconstructed (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991; Bison Books, 1993), 
X. 
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Cheyenne combat in his book, Cheyenne Memories: "The Cheyenne rule was for each member of a 
warrior band not to wait for orders or try to do like the rest. He should do all he could for 
himself, and fight privately."55 The Lakota and Cheyenne had no "official" reports or "official" 
spokespersons to prepare or present an "official" account of the battle. 
The Indian combatants of the Custer fight were members of a warrior culture that 
allowed for the exaggeration of battlefield exploits. It must be understood that by the time most 
of their accounts were recorded by white interviewers they were virtual prisoners of war confined 
to government reservations, often garrisoned with soldiers.56 Their accounts are those of 
individual human beings with individual personalities. Some accounts would be laced with 
braggadocio, while others, perhaps fearful of retribution, would be more inclined to tell a white 
interviewer whatever they thought the "white man" would want to hear. They may not have 
known that they had killed the famous Custer on the day of the battle. But by the time they 
surrendered they not only knew that they had defeated a white hero, they knew that much of 
white America was bent on vengeance. 
Richard G. Hardorff is the author or editor of a number of books about Custer, the 
Little Bighorn battle, and the Plains Indians, including: Indian Views of the Custer Fight, Cheyenne 
Memories of the Custer Fight, Lakota Recollections of the Custer Fight, Hokahey! A Good Day to Die and 
Camp, Custer and the Little BighornY Highlighting Lakota and Cheyenne interpretations of 
nineteenth century history, he described the difficulties with interviews of Native Americans. 
Such interviews "involved the interaction of three individuals: a narrator, a translator, and an 
interviewer. More often than not, these combined efforts were marred by the distortions of the 
narrator, the improficiencies of the interpreter, and the lack of objectivity of the interviewer."5B 
Utley would no doubt agree with Hardorff's assessment of translation difficulties. He 
cited the "failure of white interrogator and red witness to achieve a meeting of the minds, 
especially when, as was usually the case, a third mind, that of an interpreter, intervened."59 As a 
result, many early historians of the battle were inclined to simply overlook these sources. Others 
attempted to incorporate these accounts, but in Utley's opinion, "only a few, a very few indeed, 
have succeeded in doing more than make themselves look silly to all but the uninformed."60 
Difficulties in translation could prove disastrous. It is commonly believed that in a 
meeting with Lieutenant William Philo Clark after his surrender, the words of Crazy Horse were 
misinterpreted by Frank Grouard. Grouard may have deliberately altered Crazy Horse's intentions 
for motives involving inter-Lakota politics.61 Clark met with Crazy Horse to ask his assistance 
against Chief Joseph's Nez Perce. Crazy Horse was not enthusiastic, but according to most 
accounts, replied that he would fight until there were no Nez Perce left. Grouard translated to 
Clark that Crazy Horse had said he would fight until there were no white men left. The 
misinterpretation, intentional or not, led to Crazy Horse being bayoneted by a soldier a few days 
later when Indian police, scouts, and troops attempted to arrest him. Crazy Horse died of his 
wound that night.62 
55 John Stands in Timber and Margot Liberty, Cheyenne Memories, with assistance from 
Robert M. Utley (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967; Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1972), 
172. 
56 Hardorff, Indian Views, 12. 
57 Hardorff, Indian Views, back cover. Also Richard G. Hardorff, Hokahey!A Good Day to 
Die: The Indian Casualties of the Custer Fight (Spokane, WA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1993; 
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), back cover. 
58 Hardorff, Indian Views, 11-12. 
59 Utley, Custer, 86. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Robert A. Clark, ed., The Killing ofChiefCrarJ Horse, with a commentary by Carroll 
Friswold (Glendale: CA: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1976; Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1988), 29. 
62 Ibid., 29-36. 
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Misinterpretation of Indian intentions took forms other than language. Private Charles 
Windolph, who spent the night of the battle on Reno Hill, wrote later about seeing "great fires 
and hear[ing] the steady rhythm of Indian tom toms beating for their wild victory dances."63 Given 
that Windolph was a Prussian imrnigrant,64 and that he now found himself surrounded and 
besieged, it is easy to understand his impressions. Nonetheless, Trooper Windolph's impressions 
of what he heard that night were mistaken. According to the Cheyenne Wooden Leg, who was a 
young warrior that day, what Windolph actually heard were Lakota and Cheyenne women singing 
their mourning songs for their lost sons and husbands. "There was no dancing or celebrating in 
any of the camps that night. Too many people were in mourning. Too many Cheyenne and Sioux 
women had gashed their arms and legs to show their grief."65 
There have been histories of the battle and its Indian participants written in recent 
years that have made extensive use of Indian accounts. Utley's Sitting Bull biography makes use of 
interviews conducted by Stanley Vestal, pen name for Walter Stanley Campbell, of elderly Lakota 
living on reservations in the Dakotas in the 1920s and 1930s. Utley describes Vestal's biography 
of Sitting Bull as a literary exercise while his is of a historical nature. Utley describes his 
methodology this way: 
I have tried hard to look at Sitting Bull in terms of his cultural norms, not mine. 
Where whites drew false conclusions because of ignorance of his culture, I have 
sought to stress his perfectly rational underlying motives. Where I could not 
fathom his motives, I have tried to avoid pronouncing judgments according to my 
culture when his, if only I understood it better, might have supplied a logical 
explanation.66 
Given Utley's previous work, indications are that he considered the Lakota whom Vestal 
interviewed with the same lens with which he viewed Sitting Bull. He used his extensive 
background knowledge and internal evidence to determine when and where their accounts fit into 
his narrative. 
James Welch is part Blackfeet Indian and was born on the Blackfeet Reservation.67 He 
is not a professional historian, but rather a "fiction writer and sometimes poet."68 His book, Killing 
Custer, grew from his collaboration with filmmaker Paul Stekler, for a PBS documentary about the 
battle. Welch's sympathies lie with the Lakota and Cheyenne. He not only used the testimonials of 
the battles' Indian participants, but also spoke with their descendants to uncover the stories that 
have been passed from generation to generation. As a Native American storyteller, he is cognizant 
of the importance of utilizing Native American points of view via oral histories for Indian culture 
and understanding of history. The Dakota (Eastern Sioux) historian Angela Cavender Wilson 
explained that importance with these words. "These stories, much more so than the written 
documents by non-Indians, provide detailed descriptions about our historical players ... 
Consequently, ours are not merely interesting stories or a simple dissemination of historical facts, 
but more importantly, they are transmissions of culture upon which our survival as a people 
depends."69 
Welch is also able to uncover a rational explanation, as alluded to by Utley, for at least 
one supposed incongruity in the young Crow scout Curley's account of the battle. Curley, who 
63 Welch, 289. 
64 Ibid., 287. 
6s Ibid., 289. 
66 Utley, Lance, xv-xvi. 
67 Welch, 39. 
68 Ibid., 18. 
69 Angela Cavender Wilson, "Power of the Spoken Word: Native Oral Traditions in 
American Indian History," in Donald L. Fixico, ed., Rethinking American Indian History 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997), 111. 
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was only seventeen years old on that day, claimed to have left Custer's side only after the Metis 
scout Mitch Boyer urged him to save himself when it became obvious that Custer's luck was not 
going to carry this day. Hiding in ravines and coulees until he had made his escape, Curley claimed 
to have found a pony standing over a dead Lakota warrior. Taking the pony and the Lakota's 
Winchester and red blanket he continued on to a ridge a safe distance away, from where he 
claimed to have watched much of the battle through binocularsJO 
Some of Curley's detractors have seized on the supposedly irrational claim that a 
warrior would have carried a blanket on such a blistering hot day. To meet this criticism, Welch 
quotes historian Mardell Plainfeather: 
It was not unusual for Curley, or a Sioux, to have a blanket. In fact, Plains Indian 
people relied upon blankets for a variety of reasons and always had one on hand, no 
matter what the temperature was, especially in traveling. Blankets were used for 
saddle padding, for sudden rainstorms, for chilly summer nights, and for 
signaling the village as they returned home. During the Battle of the Little 
Bighorn, the Sioux waved blankets to frighten the horses of Custer's men.71 
Welch asserts that much of the other information Curley supplied has been validated in recent 
years and quotes Utley to back up his assertion. "Curley's testimony is a prime example of the 
blind interviewer leading the seeing witness ... The results, distorted by the interviewers rather 
than Curley, have baffled students ever since and earned Curley low marks as a witness."72 
Dr. JohnS. Gray, who died in 1991,73 is another example of one of those people who 
found themselves captivated by the events along the Little Bighorn in June of 1876. A retired 
physician and professor of physiology at Northwestern University, 74 he could not escape his 
fascination with Custer's last battle and the Metis scout Mitch Boyer who perished alongside the 
Seventh Cavalry's troopers that fateful day.75 Gray's book, Custer's Last Campaign was the end 
product of that fascination. 
Part I of the book is a narrative of Mitch Boyer's life up to his assignment as scout to 
the Seventh Cavalry on June 10, 1876.76 Part II employs "the systematic use of time-motion 
analysis."77 Gray explained this method in his Preface: "An essential element of time-motion 
analysis is speed of motion, which provides a feasibility check that exposes impossibilities. When 
an account contains blatant contradictions, one version usually proves feasible and the other 
impossible."78 
Gray used interviews with survivors of Reno's and Ben teen's commands to construct 
events up until the time the Seventh separated. However, for most of his information pertaining 
to events after the columns lost sight of each other he relies primarily on the accounts of Custer's 
Crow and Arikara scouts. After tracking the troopers' movements between geographical 
70 Welch, 162. 
7t Ibid., 164. 
72 Robert M. Utley, in foreword to JohnS. Gray, Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Bqyer and 
the Little Bighorn Reconstmcted (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991; Bison Books, 
1993), .x; quoted in Welch, 164. 
73 Gray, back cover. 
74 Ibid., Utley foreword in Gray, Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Bqyer and the Little Bighorn 
Reconstmcted x. JohnS. Gray, Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of1876 (Fort Collins, CO: The 
Old Army Press, 1976), preface. 
75 Gray, Custer's Last Campaign, xiii. 
76 Ibid., xiv. 
77 Ibid., XV. 
7B Ibid. 
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landmarks at reasonable speeds "the interviews with Indian scouts suddenly blossomed into 
lucidity and contributed mightily."79 
Along with Curley's aforementioned account and those of other Crow scouts, Gray 
made use of Orin G. Libby's 1912 interviews '>vith nine of the forty Arikara scouts who 
accompanied the Seventh on the expedition. so Libby's Arikara Narrative is itself a compelling 
and informative presentation of the Arikara's view of Custer, his final battle, and their role in the 
Army's 1876 expedition. The Arikara scouts met together at one of their number's home on the 
Fort Berthold Reservation in 1912 to tell their stories. Each scout related his account in his own 
language. The stories were translated into English by Peter Beauchamp, an Arikara who had 
attended Hampton Institute, the forerunner to the Carlisle Indian School. Beauchamp read his 
written English account back to the scouts in Arikara to insure accuracy.B1 As an Arikara educated 
in white schools Beauchamp may possibly have been able to translate Indian stories into syntax 
comprehensible to a white audience. 
The Arikara scout Red Star's assertion that Custer had told another scout, Bob-tailed 
Bull, that a victory against the hostiles would catapult him to the presidency was seized upon by 
white critics of Custer, 82 thereby adding to the whole Custer controversy.B3 Bob-tailed Bull 
perished at the Little Bighorn.84 Red Star's assertion was not corroborated by the other scouts in 
the 1912 interviews, and if Custer did indeed say as much to Bob-tailed Bull, we can only 
speculate about his reasons for doing so. 
An interesting addition to the Arikara lore of the battle is presented in John Stands in 
Timber's Ch~perme ll1.emorie.r. Bob-tailed Bull's horse was twice wounded in the battle but survived. 
The horse eluded the victorious Lakota and Cheyenne and made its lonely way all the way back to 
his owner's village some 300 miles away. The Arikara honored the horse with the name Famous 
War Horse and a song. The Arikaras used the song to honor returning veterans of the two world 
wars.ss Bob-tailed Bull's Famous War Horse certainly deserves recognition alongside his much 
more famous contemporary, Captain Myles Keogh's Commanche. Another interesting anecdote 
related in Chryenne Memories deserves at least a brief mention. As previously addressed, Major 
Marcus Reno remains even today in many comers a target of scorn for failing to come to Custer's 
aid. Coming from a totally different perspective, some Cheyenne wondered why Custer had not 
retreated to Reno's position.R6 
All of the above examples of Indian accounts are presented as an argument that the 
story of what happened beside that .'vlontana river on June 25, 1876, cannot be complete without 
the inclusion of all participants' points of view. As demonstrated, the availability of rich sources 
and new scholarship within the last half century has provided for a more complex, yet satisfying, 
understanding of the events at the Little Bighorn. Indian accounts of the events are just as 
important as the traditional white accounts to ascertaining the truth. The research into Native 
American testimonials has augmented the body of available evidence enormously and enriched 
our understanding of the Little Bighorn. 
In 1926 the body of an unidentified cavalryman was given a ceremonial burial on the 
battlefield grounds during the battle's semi-centennial celebration. A Lakota veteran of the battle 
79 Ibid. 
80 Orin G. Libby, ed., The Arikara Narrative of Custer's Campaign and the Battle of the Little 
Bighorn, with a foreword by Jerome A. Greene, with a preface by Dee Brown, with an introduction 
by D'Arcy McNickle. Originally published in 1920 under the title: The Ankara narrative of the 
campaign against the hostile Dakotas, June, 1876. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 
back cover. 
Rl D'Arcy McNickle introduction to Libby, 3. 
82 Libby, 58. 
83 Jerome A. Greene foreword to Libby, ix. 
84 Libby, 102. 
ss Stands in Timber, 210. 
8(, Ibid., 202-203. 
25 
attended the ceremony and was told through an interpreter that the whites considered the 
unidentified white soldier to be a hero. The old warrior asked to address the assembled crowd. 
Given permission to do so, he told the crowd that the Indians had lost brave men that day too. 
"After a short pause, he added reflectively that the families of these slain men had cried for the 
loss of their sons, brothers, and fathers, and that these slain Indians were also considered heroes 
among the Lakotas and the Cheyennes."87 The Lakota and Cheyenne heroes of that day were not 
only Indian heroes, they were American heroes, and America owes them the honor of hearing 
their story as seen through their peoples' eyes. 
87 Hardorff, Hokahry! A Good Dtry to Die, 14. 
